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Abstract
Property rights theory suggests that vertical integration is a sensible so-
lution to hold-up problems and therefore improves social welfare. Theories
of reciprocity, in contrast, suggest that vertical integration can reduce social
welfare if it implies an unfair distribution. Translating the hold-up situation
into a simple prisoners’ dilemma game, we provide experimental evidence for
social preferences at the individual level. Some individuals behave condition-
ally cooperative in the hold-up situation and some do not cooperate when
they are oﬀered an incentive compatible but unfair contract. Nevertheless,
property rights theory correctly predicts that vertical integration increases
aggregate welfare even in the case of unfair outcomes.
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Property rights theory suggests that well-deﬁned property rights ensure eﬃcient
allocations (Demsetz (1967)). The prisoners’ dilemma game provides an example.
Mutual cooperation would ensure the eﬃcient outcome but poorly deﬁned prop-
erty rights induce non-cooperative behavior. Well-deﬁned property rights would
internalize the negative eﬀects of non-cooperative behavior. In our experiment, we
compare the behavior of two players in a prisoners’ dilemma with the behavior of the
same players in a context with well-deﬁned property rights. In the latter situation,
ownership is concentrated in one hand and the owner can adjust payments to the
other player according to the behavior. Incentive compatible payments are therefore
possible. Such concentration of ownership, however, can also lead to a more unfair
distribution of welfare. This may deter people with reciprocal preferences from co-
operation. Since people with reciprocal preferences often cooperate in a prisoners’
dilemma, it can occur that well-deﬁned property rights induce allocations which
are pareto-inferior to allocations in the prisoners’ dilemma. Our design allows to
test if the reassignment of property rights in fact improves social welfare even if its
distribution becomes unfair.
The reallocation of property rights is a crucial problem in situations like the hold-up
problem. The hold-up problem is “of central concern to business people” (Holm-
str¨ om and Roberts (1998), p. 80). In its most simple representation, the problem
can be expressed as a prisoners’ dilemma (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)). Holm-
str¨ om and Roberts (1998) already point to situations with poorly deﬁned property
rights and nevertheless very cooperative behavior. There are various explanations for
their observation, e.g. reputation mechanisms (Halonen (2002), Bar-Isaac (2007))
or relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002)). Rajan and Zingales
(1998) show that the regulation of access to critical resources can dominate this
solution. Tirole (1986) and Gul (2001) argue that investment incentives increase
with asymmetric information in hold-up problems if investment activities are un-
observable. Experimental evidence (e.g. Hackett (1994), Sloof, Oosterbeek, and
2Sonnemans (2007)) suggests that these explanations do not explain high ex-ante
investments suﬃciently. Instead, the results of these experimental studies show that
social preferences play a major role in explaining relationship speciﬁc investments.
Additionally, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) show experimentally that ex-ante
investments in a hold-up problem lead to better ex-post bargaing outcomes. How-
ever, none of these studies suggests that feasible vertical integration would not lead
to an eﬃcient outcome, making all other mechanisms redundant. Only Von Siemens
(2007) shows theoretically that incomplete contracts may be eﬃcient in hold-up
problem with renegotiation if some players have social preferences.
Additional to the above literature with a speciﬁc focus on relationship speciﬁc in-
vestments, there is overwhelming experimental evidence that people in the prisoners’
dilemma in fact cooperate frequently (for a summary, see G¨ achter (2007)), although
players’ proﬁt maximization goals are diametrically opposed. Further, monitoring
may be counterproductive (e.g. Falk and Kosfeld (2006)), and incentive contracts
may backﬁre (as summarized by Fehr and Falk (2002) or Bowles (2008)) because
agents behave reciprocal. Reciprocity and conditional cooperation explain many de-
viations from conventional economic predictions in public good games and prisoners’
dilemmas (G¨ achter (2007)). Some people are ready to cooperate if they expect oth-
ers to do so as well but refuse to do so if they do not have this expectation. Groups
of like-minded people achieve and maintain high levels of cooperation (G¨ achter and
Th¨ oni (2005)) while heterogeneity leads to lower cooperation over time (Fischbacher
and G¨ achter (2009)).
Both conditional cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma and defection under an un-
fair incentive contract share characteristics that are key building blocks for theories
of reciprocal behavior. The ﬁrst behavior can be classiﬁed as positive and the sec-
ond as negative reciprocity. Our experiment, thus, also tests whether there is a
correlation between positive and negative reciprocity in general. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) assume for parts of their analysis also a positive correlation between positive
and negative inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), p. 841 and the relevant
appendix). Falk and Fischbacher (2006) use in their model just one parameter for
3both positive and negative reciprocity. So far, there are only few articles that exam-
ine the relationship between positive and negative reciprocity empirically. Dohmen,
Falk, Huﬀman, and Sunde (2009) measure a correlation of only 0.021 in relevant
survey questions in Germany. Herrmann and Orzen (2008) and Brosig, Riechmann,
and Weimann (2007) ﬁnd no systematic correlation for reciprocal behavior across
diﬀerent games.
Our experiment is designed to test the predictions of property rights theory with
subjects who may have social preferences. In the ﬁrst game of our experiment, sub-
jects play a prisoners’ dilemma. This reﬂects the non-integrated situation. In the
second game, the aggregate payoﬀs remain the same than in the prisoners’ dilemma,
but the relationship of the two players is now transferred into an integrated situation
with players being the “employer” and “employee”, respectively, of each other. The
owner can choose between two contracts for the employee. Both contracts are incen-
tive compatible for selﬁsh employees but one of the two possible contracts leads to
unequal payoﬀs in the case of mutual cooperation. Property rights theory and the
social preferences literature make very diﬀerent predictions for this. Property rights
theory expects social welfare being maximized in the second game due to the inter-
nalization of external eﬀects. In the prisoners’ dilemma this theory does not predict
any cooperation. Theories of reciprocity predict some cooperation in the ﬁrst game.
The second game only implies a certain welfare improvement if employers choose
the fair contract.
As we use a within-subject design, our approach diﬀers from papers which compare
explicit and implicit incentive contracts. Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) show that
incentive contracts outperform trust contracts with ex-ante wage payments, but
not bonus contracts with ex-post wage payments. Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt
(2008) look at the endogenous development of property rights among subjects with
heterogenous social preferences. They ﬁnd that joint ownership provides the eﬃcient
solution relative to single ownership. In their experiment ownership does not allow
for incentive compatible contracts or no ownership at all.
4Our results show that overall welfare increases with vertical integration, even if
the oﬀered incentive contracts are not fair. Thus, the results suggest that vertical
integration is a sensible policy in hold-up problems. At the individual level, we also
ﬁnd behavior that contradicts conventional economic theory, in particular a high
share of (conditional) cooperators in the hold-up problem and defections in the case
of unfair incentive contracts. However, behavior in the hold-up problem does not
predict behavior in vertically integrated units.
Our paper is structured as follows. We introduce the design and procedures of the
experiment in section 2 and present some behavioral predictions of both property
rights and social preferences theory in section 3. In section 4 we discuss the experi-
mental results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experiment
2.1 Design
The subjects in our experiment play two games, where the second game is an in-
tegrated version of the ﬁrst. In the following, we will ﬁrst introduce the common
features of the two games and then explain in detail their diﬀerences. In both games
each participant has a binary choice between cooperation and defection. Given the
set of choices the total revenue of both participants is identical in both games but
distributions diﬀer. If both participants cooperate the overall output is 10 points.
If just one participant cooperates and the other defects the output is 6, and mutual
defection yields a total of 2. The marginal revenue of cooperation is therefore 4.
Each game is a sequential game. Player 1 decides ﬁrst and player 2 decides after-
wards. The assignment of participants to the roles of player 1 and 2 is random in
both games. All information about behavior and revenues in both games is revealed
at the end of the experiment. Each player has a diﬀerent “partner” in each game.
5In the ﬁrst game (our base game NonInt) the distribution of revenue resembles a
standard prisoners’ dilemma. If both players cooperate, each party earns 5 points.
If both defect the per capita reward is 1. If just one player cooperates, the defecting
player gets all 6 points. In our experiment, we use a sequential order of decisions.
Thus, player 1 decides ﬁrst between cooperation and defection. Next, player 2
decides, knowing already the decision of player 1 (see Figure 1). We use the strategy
method to elicit responses for both possible assignments of the roles of player 1 and
player 2: both participants enter their decisions for the two roles of player 1 and
player 2, where they enter one decision for the role of being player 1 and two decisions
for the role of player 2, conditioning on both possible choices of player 1. To avoid
a predetermination of choices in the second game, we informed players about their
actual role in the ﬁrst game only after they played the second game.
Figure 1: Decision Structure in NonInt
The second game transfers the prisoners’ dilemma into a vertically integrated sit-
uation. We name this game Int. Figure 2 depicts the structure of this game.
Player 1 can choose between two take-it-or-leave-it contracts which determine the
distribution of payoﬀs between the two players. The fair contract provides equal
rewards for both players for cooperative behavior. Player 2 receives 5 points in case
of cooperation and 2 points in case of defection. All remaining points remain with
player 1. In the unfair contract, player 2 gets a lower, but nevertheless incentive
compatible reward. Player 2 gets 3 points for cooperation and 2 points for defection.
Referring to our research question about the conﬂict between property rights theory
6and theories of reciprocity, we are mostly interested in the reactions of players 2 to
the unfair oﬀer in this integrated situation compared to their decision as player 2 in
the non-integrated situation above.
Figure 2: Decision Structure in Int 32
In two sessions we reduced the payoﬀs for player 2’s cooperation (defection) in the
contractual setting to 2 (1) (see Figure 3). We use these additional observations
as a robustness check to see whether the rejection of unfair oﬀers is sensitive to a
modiﬁcation of its relative cost. We name the two variants of this game according
to the payoﬀs under the unfair contract Int 32 and Int 21.
In Int, each participant plays only one role either of player 1 or player 2. Player 1
only makes the actual decision between the two options “cooperate” and “defect”
and, of course, between the two contracts. For player 2 we again use the strategy
method such that player 2 decides between the two options cooperate and defect in
each contract, knowing whether player 1 cooperates or defects, but not the contract
oﬀered.
In our experiment we use a within-subject design. That is, all players participated
ﬁrst in the NonInt and next in the Int. To avoid an updating of beliefs about
others’ cooperation, we inform them neither about the behavior of their opponent
7Figure 3: Decision Structure in Int 21
nor about the result of the random draw in the ﬁrst game before they make their
decisions in the second. Matching is organized in matching groups of each four
participants where we no participant meets the same opponent in both games.
2.2 Procedures
The experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Overall, 132
subjects participated in the experiment, 92 in Int 32 and 40 in Int 21. Thus, we
receive a total of 66 independent observations. 65 of the players 1 in Int chose to
cooperate but could not reveal their contract choice. Hence we have 65 observations
for player 2 which we can compare statistically.
Subjects were students of the University of Konstanz, recruited via ORSEE (Greiner
(2004)). The experiment took place in lakelab, the laboratory for experimental
economics at the University of Konstanz. All sessions lasted less than one hour. The
experimental currency are points, with each point being converted into 1 Euro after
the experiment. On average, participants earned 12.33 Euros in the experiment with
a standard deviation of 3.05. Before the experiment, subjects received instructions
8about the experiment. Before the experiment started each subject had to answer
control questions about the experiments. The experiment started when all subjects
had answered all question correctly. The Appendix contains the instructions and
questions, translated from German.
3 Behavioral Predictions
In this section we develop hypotheses about the behavior of subjects in our exper-
iment. These hypotheses derive from conventional economic theory and theories
of reciprocity. The experiment contains two games, the nonintegrated prisoners’
dilemma game and the integrated version of this game with incentive wage setting.
Interaction is anonymous, no results are revealed during the experiment and sub-
jects are matched with diﬀerent other players in the two diﬀerent games. Hence, we
can treat both games as independent games. We ignore risk aversion.
We are particularly interested in the behavior of second movers in both games. In
detail, we consider whether there is a relationship between conditional cooperation
of second movers in the nonintegrated game and the rejection of unfair oﬀers in the
integrated game. Both these decisions have in common that they reduce, in absolute
terms, the inequality in outcomes (as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000)). Futhermore, both decisions respond to behavior which can be
seen as a statement of intentions (as in Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Rabin (1993)
or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)): a ﬁrst mover who cooperates in sequential
prisoners’ dilemma makes a kind decision, while the choice of the unfair incentive
scheme is an unkind decision.
In both of our games, there are 2 players, indexed by i ∈ [1,2]. Let x = xi denote
the monetary payoﬀ of player i. The utility function of a selﬁsh player i ∈ [1,2] is
given by
Ui(x)=x
9We expect that some people will act selﬁsh but by no means all of them. Selﬁshness
is one assumption underlying property rights theory and therefore one benchmark.
The following results are one yardstick in the development of our hypothesis.
1. With 2 selﬁsh players participating in the game, each player will
(a) never cooperate in the nonintegrated prisoners’ dilemma.
(b) always cooperate under incentive contracts, irrespective of its fairness.
(c) choose the unfair contract as principal.
These results derive directly from Figures 1 to 3. Selﬁshness is one benchmark for our
analysis but most experimental studies show that some subjects have a preference
for reciprocity. For simplicity, we model reciprocity as inequity aversion, using the
model setup from Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
In Fehr and Schmidt (1999), players with inequity aversion have the following utility
function.
Ui(x)=x − αi max(xj − xi,0) − βi max(xi − xj,0),i = j,αi ≥ βi,0 ≤ βi < 1
The second term in this equation measures the utility loss from disadvantageous
inequality, while the third term measures the loss from advantageous inequality.
Our results hold for any distributions of α and β in the population, as long as
αi ≥ βi,0 ≤ βi < 1 holds. The distributions are common knowledge but individual
preferences are unobservable.
The size of our subject pool and the experimental design ensure homogeneous beliefs
about the preferences of the other players throughout the entire experiment. Then
the following predictions can be derived for the behavior of an player i who faces
another player j with unknown characteristics:
2. In the nonintegrated sequential prisoner’s dilemma (NonInt)
10(a) any player i with βi > 1
6 will cooperate as second mover, if the ﬁrst mover
has chosen to cooperate.
(b) a suﬃciently large share of players with β>1
6 ensures that ﬁrst movers
choose to cooperate.
(c) ﬁrst movers with a low α are more likely to cooperate than those with a
high α.
(d) players 1 with a low β are less likely to cooperate than those with a high
β.
3. In the integrated game with complete ownership and incentive contract (Int)
(a) all players cooperate as player 1.
(b) all players cooperate as player 2 if they receive a fair contract.
(c) any player i with αi > 1
2 will not cooperate as player 2 if she receives an
unfair contract.
(d) a suﬃciently large share of players with α>1
2 ensures that the fair
contract will be oﬀered.
(e) players with a low β are less likely to oﬀer the fair contract than those
with a high β.
All quantitative expressions are derived from treatment Int 32. Qualitatively, the
results do not diﬀer from treatment Int 21. A more detailed derivation of these
predictions is provided in the appendix. We use these predictions to derive testable
hypotheses to contrast the predictions of property rights theory and theories of social
preferences with respect to vertical integration and incentive contracts.
Property rights theory suggests that predictions 1a to 1c about the behavior of
players are correct. Hence, we can derive the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 The joint payoﬀ of player 1 and player 2 will be higher in Int than
in NonInt, even if the unfair contract is chosen.
11Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest that some of the players exhibit social preferences.
Therefore, we base our following hypotheses on predictions 2a to 2d as well as 3a to
3e. Note that these predictions include predictions for a homo oeconomicus in the
case of α = β = 0. In some situations the predictions of theories of social preferences
and property rights theory are identical, e.g. for predictions 3a and 3b. This allows
for the following hypothesis
Hypothesis 2 All players cooperate in Int as player 1. All players 2 cooperate if
they receive a fair contract.
As we have just seen that the contract choice can be relevant for the cooperation
of second movers in Int, we also have to look at the contract choices of players 1
in this game. Remember prediction 1c that according to property rights theory the
contract oﬀer will always be unfair in an interaction of two selﬁsh players. From
predictions 2d and 3e, in contrast, we derive the following hypothesis regarding the
contract choice of players with social preferences.
Hypothesis 3 Subjects that are cooperative as ﬁrst movers in NonInt are more
likely to oﬀer the fair contract in Int.
Prediction 3c implies that negative reciprocators (α>0) defect under unfair in-
centive contracts. According to prediction 2c, the same subjects are less likely to
cooperate as ﬁrst movers in NonInt because their loss in utility is rather high if
the second mover defects. Property rights theory does not predict any cooperation
among the ﬁrst movers in NonInt and no defection in Int.
Hypothesis 4 Subjects that are cooperative as ﬁrst movers in NonInt are less
likely to defect when they face unfair incentive contracts in Int.
We use predictions 2a and 3c to identify positive and negative reciprocity. A condi-
tionally cooperative second mover in NonInt is characterized as a player exhibiting
12positive reciprocity, while a player 2 rejecting unfair oﬀers in Int exhibits negative
reciprocity. For the above analysis, we had to set the correlation between positive
and negative reciprocity to zero. Let now r denote the relevant correlation coeﬃ-
cient between the two. A positive correlation between the two characteristics would
conﬁrm the following core hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 Subjects that are conditionally cooperative as second movers in the
nonintegrated prisoners’ dilemma game are more likely to defect in the integrated
game when they face unfair incentive contracts, if r>0.
In our experiment we can only observe r.I fw eﬁ n dr>0 it is obvious that subjects
with speciﬁc preferences are more likely to prefer the ambiguous dilemma to an
seemingly unambiguous, but unfair incentive contract.
4 Results
In the prisoners’ dilemma we ﬁnd that 40 percent of the participants are egoists.
They defect as second movers no matter what the other player decided. About 46
percent are conditional cooperators reciprocating the ﬁrst mover’s choice, and 11
percent of the participants are always cooperative. The remaining 3 percent of the
subjects cannot be classiﬁed into one of the above categories. The distribution of
types in our population is therefore similar to the distributions in synonym experi-
ments in the literature. G¨ achter, Nosenzo, Renner, and Sefton (2008), for instance,
using a similar design to NonInt but with more variations in subjects’ choices,
ﬁnd 46 percent egoists, 48 percent reciprocators, and 3 percent unconditional co-
operators. Figure 4 presents the distribution of the diﬀerent types in our NonInt
game.
58% of all egoists decided to cooperate as ﬁrst movers. Among the conditional co-
operators 85% did. These decisions as ﬁrst movers reﬂect the expectation that the
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Figure 4: Distribution of types in NonInt
second mover is a conditional cooperator. This diﬀerence may reﬂect a false con-
sensus eﬀect, whereby selﬁsh subjects believe others are selﬁsh and reciprocal sub-
jects believe others are reciprocal (Altmann, Dohmen, and Wibral (2008), G¨ achter,
Nosenzo, Renner, and Sefton (2008)).
The behavior of participants in the two conditions Int 32 and Int 21 does not
diﬀer. 67 percent of the players 1 in Int 32 oﬀer the unfair contract and 70 percent
of the players 1 in Int 21. Of the players 2, 22 percent reject the unfair oﬀer in
Int 32 and 15 percent do so in Int 21. Neither of the two diﬀerences is signiﬁcant
(two-sided Fisher Exact Test). Thus, in the following we jointly evaluate the data
of the two conditions.
144.1 Welfare
We measure welfare by the joint proﬁt of both players. Thus, welfare is 10 if both
players cooperate, 2 if both defect, and 6 if one player cooperate and the other
defects. To calculate welfare, we determine the expected frequency of the three
diﬀerent outcomes (cooperate, cooperate), (cooperate, defect), and (defect, defect)
within our population of subjects. Next, we multiply the expected frequency of
(cooperate, cooperate) by 10, the expected freqency of (cooperate, defect) by 6, and
the expected frequency of (defect, defect) by 2, and sum up these values. The result
is 6.89 points in NonInt and 9.40 points in Int.
For the statistical tests, we average expected welfare in NonInt over the outcomes
of the game for both possible role assignments of player 1 and player 2 within one
pair. In Int, we can calculate welfare within each pair directly, because players 1
enter only their actual decisions. The diﬀerence of welfare between the two games
is statistically signiﬁcant in a Wilcoxon rank sum test (one-sided) at the 1 percent
level. Even the most beneﬁcial assignment of partners in the SPD would not yield
welfare levels close to the results derived from the unfair incentive contracts. Thus,
we conclude that vertical integration in fact improves welfare, conﬁrming hypothesis
1.
Most welfare gains derive from two simple observations, conﬁrming hypothesis 2.
First, all (except one) principals choose the cooperative option.1 Second, the incen-
tive compatible payment scheme makes most agents cooperate - naturally under the
fair, but to a great share also under the unfair contract.
1We excluded the decision of the respective agent whose principal did not cooperate from the
statistical test above.
154.2 Contract Choices
Figure 5 summarizes the choices which contract players 1 oﬀered to players 2 in the
Int game. On average, players having a positive expectation of others’ conditional
cooperation oﬀer the fair contract more often (38 percent) than those with a negative
expectation (14 percent). This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level (Fisher Exact Test, two-sided). Thus, we conﬁrm hypothesis 3. Egoists oﬀer
the fair contract less often (26 percent) than (conditional) cooperators (37 percent).
This second diﬀerence, however, is statistically not signiﬁcant.
% of Fair Contract Offers in the Integrated Case Depending on 



















Figure 5: Contract Choices
4.3 Reactions of the diﬀerent types in NonInt to unfair of-
fers in Int
There is no diﬀerence between the cooperative and noncooperative ﬁrst movers
in NonInt with respect to their reaction to unfair contracts in Int. Out of the




















Figure 6: Reactions of the Egoists and Cooperators from NonInt in Int
cooperative ﬁrst movers, 80 percent later accept the unfair contract, compared 78
percent of uncooperative ﬁrst movers. Thus, we have to reject hypothesis 4.
Although we found at an aggregate level that vertical integration increases welfare,
20 percent of all agents do not cooperate in Int if they are oﬀered an incentive
compatible but unfair payment scheme. Assuming a correlation between positive and
negative reciprocity, we might expect that positive reciprocity in NonInt (identiﬁed
as conditional cooperation of the second movers) correlates with negative reciprocity
(rejection of an unfair oﬀer) in Int. Thus, we predict that conditional cooperators
in the ﬁrst game are more likely to defect in the second game if they are oﬀered
the unfair contract (hypothesis 5). Egoists and strict cooperators in NonInt,i n
contrast, should cooperate independently of the contract oﬀered. Figure 6 shows
the reactions of egoists and (conditional) cooperators in the second game.
Agents who stricly or conditionally cooperate in NonInt both have a cooperation
rate of just 78 percent as agents in the unfair incentive relationship, compared to
84 percent in the case of egoists according to the SPD. The diﬀerences are statis-
tically insigniﬁcant which implies a zero correlation between negative and positive
17reciprocity. The correlation coeﬃcient between the two is r =0 .0696. We therefore
reject hypothesis 5.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the impact of concentrated ownership on behavior. We mo-
tivated our research program because of experimental evidence which contradicts
crucial assumptions of property rights theory. We can conﬁrm the experimental
evidence, in particular a high share of (conditional) cooperators in the hold-up
problem and defection in the case of unfair incentive contracts. Yet, the evidence
has no crucial implications for welfare and strategic considerations. We ﬁnd that
vertical integration increases welfare relative to a prisoner’s dilemma even if very
unfair incentive contracts are implemented. This result holds for egoists and condi-
tional cooperators alike. Yet, we ﬁnd no correlation between positive and negative
reciprocity. Behavior in the hold-up problem does not predict behavior in vertically
integrated units.
In the context of our simple experiment, vertical integration is a sensible solution for
hold-up problems even if the underlying economic theory is not accurate. There are
several reasons for it: ﬁrst, vertical integration induces at least one player to behave
cooperatively, the prospective owner of the ﬁrm. Only his employee may consider
defection. Second, vertical integration is strictly welfare maximizing if it is combined
with a fair incentive contract. This ﬁnding is in line with the observation in Fehr,
Kremhelmer, and Schmidt (2008), that joint ownership dominates single ownership.
Finally, even with an unfair incentive contract, agents on average receive higher
beneﬁts than in the ambiguous situation of the prisoners dilemma.
Summing up, the unfair contract implies some risk of defection but the behavior in
the prisoners dilemma does not predict defection. Hence, we ﬁnd no strategic reason
for avoiding the unfair contract. The choice between the fair and the unfair contract
rather depends on the risk aversion and the social preferences of the principal than
the agent.
186 Appendix A: Results of the Behavioral Predic-
tions
In the following we derive the results in section 3. We ﬁrst consider the choices of
both players in NonInt and then in Int.
6.1 Behavioral Predictions in NonInt
Let us ﬁrst consider the reasoning of a second mover (player 2) in game NonInt (see
Table 1). Cooperation in this game is reasonable for player 2 if player 1 cooperates





Cooperate 5, 5 −6α,6− 6β
Defect 6 − 6β, −6α 1, 1
Table 1: NonInt, second mover (player 2 is relevant)
Anticipating the behavior of diﬀerent types of second movers and their distribution
in the population, the ﬁrst mover (player 1) in NonInt applies the following rea-
soning (see Table 2): The sure payoﬀ from defection for player 1 is 1. Thus, any
type of player 1 will only cooperate if the expected proﬁt from cooperation is at
least 1. Further, player 1 knows that a second mover only cooperates if β2 > 1
6.
Let δ denote the share of subjects with β2 > 1
6. Thus, a player 1 cooperates only if
δ>
1+6α1
5+6α1. Hence, cooperation decreases in the α of the ﬁrst mover.
6.2 Behavioral Predictions in Int 32
Let us for Int 32 again start with the behavior of the second mover (player 2). All




Cooperate 5, 5 −6α, 6(1 − δ)+( 6− 6β)δ
Defect (6 − 6β), −6αγ 1, 1
Table 2: NonInt, ﬁrst mover (player 1 is relevant)
will not all oﬀer the fair contract to player 2. For players 2, we therefore have to
distinguish the reactions to a fair and to an unfair contract oﬀer. Confronted with




Cooperate 5, 5 1 − 4α,5− 4β
Defect 5 − 4β,1− 4α 1, 1
Table 3: Int 32, fair contract oﬀer, second mover (player 2 is relevant)






Cooperate 7 − 4β,3− 4α 4 − 2β,2− 2α
Defect 3, 3 −2α,2− 2β
Table 4: Int 32, unfair contract oﬀer, second mover (player 2 is relevant)
Finally, we have to consider the contract choice of player 1 in Int 32. The payoﬀ
from choosing the fair contract is always 5. The payoﬀ from choosing the unfair
contract is 7(1 − γ)+4 γ, with γ denoting the share of players 2 with α2 > 1
2.





207 Appendix B: Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the instruc-
tions carefully. From now on we ask you to remain seated and to stop communicating
with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will
come to your place and answer your questions in private. It is very important that
you follow these rules.
The instructions are identical for all participants. Please take your time to read and
understand them. Should any questions or unclearnesses about something occur
please do not hesitate to ask us, we will come to you.
Your payoﬀ in this experiment depends on your decisions as well as those of other.
You will not be told which participants these are as will nobody be informed about
your identity.
The experiment consists out of two parts in each of which you will be interacting
with another participant. You will be interacting with a diﬀerent other participant
in part two than in part one. Your payoﬀs will be added up after you ﬁnished both
parts. During the experiment your payoﬀs will be counted in points. Each point
you gain is worth 1 Euro cash after the experiment. You will get another 4 Euro for
participating.
You and the other participant will be asked to decide between to possible choices
(A and B) in both parts of the experiment.
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment your payoﬀ will depend on the decisions of both
you and the other participant.
• If you both choose A each of you gets 5 points
• If you both choose B each of you gets 1 point.
21• If one of you chooses A and one chooses B the person choosing A gets 0 points
and the person choosing B gets 6 points
The following table is a summary of the payoﬀs:
Decision of the other My Decision My Payoﬀ Payoﬀ of the other
A A 5 5
A B 6 0
B A 0 6
B B 1 1
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment you and the other participant will make your
decisions in a sequential order. However, initially you will not know which of you
actually has to decide ﬁrst. Thus, you will be asked to make decisions for both
possible orders. If you decide ﬁrst, you simply state you will choose either A or B.
In case you have to decide second you have to choose between A and B twice, once
for both possible preceeding decisions of the other participant.
The actual order will be randomly choosen by the computer only after you and the
other participant have made your decisions for both possible orders. The probabilites
are equally distributed.
• If chance puts you ﬁrst only your ﬁrst decision counts. The reaction decisions
you made will not count for you payoﬀ. Your payoﬀ will be calculated with
the help of the ﬁgure shown above and depending on the reaction decision of
the other participant.
• If chance puts you second only the ﬁrst decision of the other participant counts.
Only your reaction decision to the decision of the ﬁrst player counts for you.
You will not receive any information concering the outcome of the ex-
periment at this stage. The second part will start immediately instead.
22In the second part of the experiment you and the other participant will play two
diﬀerent roles (roles 1 and 2). Your role will be determined randomly at the begin-
ning of the second part and be told to you. You will then only make decisions for
your role.
Like in part 1 you and the other participant will make a decision between A and B.
However, the payoﬀs will be diﬀerent. The participant who plays role 1 will get the
sum of the payoﬀs of both the participants as in part one. Hence, if you are playing
role 1 you will get the sum of the columns “my payoﬀ” and “payoﬀ of the other
participant” out of the ﬁgure shown in part 1.





If you are playing role 1 you have to give the other participant a part of your payoﬀ.
You have to give him at least 2 points but may choose to give him more as a bonus
if he chooses A. You have to choose between two diﬀerent payoﬀ structures:
1. Participant 2 gets a total of 5 points if he chooses A. Therefore, you give him
3 points in addition to the 2 points you have to give him.
2. Participant 2 gets a total of 3 points. Therefore, you give him only 1 point in
addition to the 2 points you have to give him.
If you are playing role 1 you will decide for one of the two variants ﬁrst. Then you
will choose between A and B like in part 1. Depending on which variant you decided












A A 10 5 5
B A 6 1 5
A B 6 4 2












A A 10 7 3
B A 6 3 3
A B 6 4 2
B B 2 0 2
If you are playing role 2 you will be informed about player 1’s decision between A
and B before you have to decide yourself. You will be asked to make a decision
for both possible variants. However, you will only be told how many points player
1 oﬀers you as a reward for choosing A (1 or 3 points) after you have made your
decision. Depending on the variant player 1 chose you will get either 5 or 3 points
for choosing A and always 2 points for choosing B.
In the end of the experiment you will be informed about:
• the order of decisions in the ﬁrst part of the experiment
• your own decisions in both parts of the experiment
• the decisions of the other players in both parts and,
24• your payoﬀs of each part and the whole experiment
In the end your payoﬀs from both parts will be added up and paid to you. The
exchange rate is 1 Euro per point. You will get another 4 Euros for participating.
After having read these instructions please answer the following test questions. The
experiment will begin after everybody has anwered the questions correctly. You will
be asked to answer another questionnaire after the experiment.
Before starting please answer the following questions ﬁrst to check if you understand
everything you need to:
1. Presume you and the other participant make the following decisions in the
ﬁrst part of the experiment:
• If you have to decide ﬁrst you choose A.
• If you have to decide second you choose
– B, if the other participant chose A.
– A, if the other participant chose B.
• If the other participant decides ﬁrst he chooses B.
• If the other participant decides second he chooses:
– A, if you chose A.
– B, if you chose B.
Afterwards the computer decides you have to decide ﬁrst and the other par-
ticipant second. What are the payoﬀs in the ﬁrst part of the experiment?
You: The other participant:
2. Presume you have been assigned role 2 in the second part of the experiment.
• The other participant decides to choose A and oﬀer you variant 2.
• You want to decide like the following:
25– If you are oﬀered variant 1 you play A.
– If you are oﬀered variant 2 you play B.
What are the payoﬀs in the second part of the experiment?
You: The other participant:
3. Presume you have been assigned role 2 in the second part of the experiment.
• The other participant decides to choose A and oﬀer you variant 2.
• You want to decide like the following:
– If you are oﬀered variant 1 you play B.
– If you are oﬀered variant 2 you play A.
What are the payoﬀs in the second part of the experiment?
You: The other participant:
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